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Abstract 
 
A number of public finance management reforms over the last several decades have 
served to improve governance in Indonesia. In too many cases, however, reform measures have 
failed to realize their full potential. Certainly the need for fundamental change was widely ac-
cepted. Indonesia has been examining major public finance reform initiatives in a number of ju-
risdictions that are relevant to Indonesia, with a view to fostering improvements in governance. 
Our examination of reforms in New Zealand encompassed an extensive review of the literatures. 
From the New Zealand's experience, it will be an input for implementing good governance in In-
donesia. 
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Abstrak 
 
Beberapa pengalaman reformasi manajemen keuangan publik selama beberapa dekade 
terakhir telah membantu peningkatan tata pemerintahan di Indonesia. Dalam banyak kasus, 
langkah-langkah reformasi telah gagal dalam merealisasikan kemampuannya. Tentu saja 
kebutuhan akan perubahan yang mendasar telah diterima secara luas. Indonesia telah melaku-
kan beberapa penyesuaian terkait dengan reformasi keuangan terutama pada yurisdiksi yang 
relevan dengan kondisi di  Indonesia, dengan maksud untuk mendorong perbaikan tata kelola. 
Pengamatan kami terhadap reformasi di Selandia Baru mencakup tinjauan ekstensif dari 
literatur. Pengalaman tersebut tentunya akan menjadi masukan untuk menerapkan good 
governance di Indonesia. 
 
Kata kunci: Selandia Baru, Tata Kelola Pemerintahan, Standar  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, Indonesia has been ex-
amining major public finance reform initia-
tives in a number of jurisdictions that are rele-
vant to Indonesia, with a view to fostering im-
provements in governance.  
This article focuses on reform of the 
core public finance in New Zealand. It ex-
amines the principal stages of a decade of re-
forms, including public financial management, 
the fundamental changes in the approach to 
management and accountability and more re-
cent initiatives which perpetuate and consoli-
date those reforms. Our examination of reforms 
in New Zealand encompassed an extensive re-
view of the literatures. Quotations from these 
sources are presented throughout this article.  
The article begins with an outline of 
the context of public finance reform: the insti-
tutional setting and the significant changes in 
New Zealand following an economic crisis in 
1984. It then examines the various phases of 
reform, attempting to explain their origins and 
evolution and assessing progress to date. It 
concludes with a discussion of matters which, 
in our view, are of particular relevance to the 
government of Indonesia .  
 
An Importance of Benchmark 
A benchmark  is a: (1) A methodical 
study; (2) A discovery process, (3) An im-
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provement method;  (4) A learning opportuni-
ty; (5) A management commitment, (6) A tool 
used to identify, establish, and achieve stan-
dards of excellence; (7) A continuous process. 
The aim of benchmarking is to com-
pare the performance of the companies against 
each other, to identify which companies that 
operate the most efficient and give a ranking 
of the remaining companies referred the effi-
cient ones. Why do you benchmark? The rea-
son are: (1) Satisfy customers’ needs and ex-
pectations; (2) Adapt “Best Practices”; (3) 
Develop and stimulate strategic planning; (4) 
Encourage creative thinking - getting out of 
the box, (5) Achieve superior performance; (6) 
Accelerate process improvement; (7) Re-
view/study competitive comparisons; (8) Dis-
cover emerging technologies. 
 The entities can do a benchmark when: 
(1) Management is looking for a change; (2) 
The organization is implementing a new 
process; (3) The dynamics of industry is chang-
ing; (4) The organization is striving for perfor-
mance excellence using continuous improve-
ment; (5) A change is required in processes, 
products, or services; (6) The organization 
needs to reinvent itself in order to survive. 
 
New Zealand Model in Public Finance  
The New Zealand reforms were direct-
ly stimulated by economic and fiscal condi-
tions. A fiscal crisis in 1984 involving a stag-
nant economy, high national debt, 20% deval-
uation and an exchange rate crisis led to a 
search for ways to reduce public spending. An 
attempt by ministers in 1985 and 1986 to scru-
tinize spending highlighted the poor informa-
tion base for decision-making and the perverse 
incentives for heads of departments. Criti-
cisms of the prevailing arrangements included 
concern that the input based information sys-
tem was largely useless for making effective 
decisions, and that incentives encouraged 
managers to protect and expand resources.  
Input controls restricted managerial 
discretions required to improve performance 
and also provided a place to lay blame for 
poor performance. Agencies faced conflicting 
objectives, roles and responsibilities that made 
it difficult to hold them accountable for the 
achievement of any objectives, for example, 
commercial and non-commercial functions 
were often placed together. Staff quality was 
variable, and restrictive employment condi-
tions out of step with private sector conditions 
favored inside appointments and made the 
public service unattractive. 
At the same time, public sector em-
ployment arrangements encouraged costly 
wage settlements. Not all the problems were 
seen as bureaucratic. Ministers saw the budget 
as a game where the winner extracted the 
greatest increase in resources (Scott and 
McKenzie, 2001). 
Overall, government was an inefficient 
and sometimes ineffective supplier of many 
goods and services that were considered better 
provided by the private sector such as tele-
communications, railways, airline services, 
construction, farming and forestry.  
 
The sequence of reforms 
Sequencing was determined by fiscal 
aims and attention was paid to the areas of 
largest gain. As the reforms provided managers 
with freedom to manage in return for accounta-
bilities under the Public Finance Act, the tim-
ing of the employment reforms and the finance 
reforms was necessarily closely related. 
These internal reforms were accompa-
nied by other, external changes. The Official 
Information Act 1982 increased the availabili-
ty of information held by public sector organi-
zations. It has been widely used by the opposi-
tion, media, interest groups and the public to 
obtain information on performance and other 
matters. The increasing use of judicial review 
through the courts has placed decisions taken 
by government under a spotlight. Public or-
ganizations are more aware of need to follow 
good processes in making decisions. Increas-
ing demands for participation in government 
decision-making by Maori people has led to 
greater consultation requirements. 
 
AN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN 
TRANSFORMATION  
About the Country and Its People  
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New Zealand is an island nation in the 
South Pacific, roughly the size of the United 
Kingdom in area but sparsely populated, with 
3.5 million people, and geographically remote 
from other countries (Australia lie almost 
2,000 kilometers to the west, across the Tas-
man Sea).  
The two major islands are North Island 
and South Island, stretching some 1,700 kilo-
meters in combined length, but narrow across 
- no locality is more than 110 kilometers from 
the sea. The climate is temperate, and much of 
the terrain is mountainous, with the greater 
part of the agricultural land on North Island. A 
significant proportion of the population lives 
in cities, the largest being Auckland (820,000 
inhabitants) and Wellington, the capital 
(323,000), both on North Island, and Christ-
church (300,000) on South Island. 
A former British colony and a member 
of the Commonwealth, New Zealand is a 
democratic nation with a parliamentary system 
of government. It is a unitary state, with a 
constitution similar to that of the United 
Kingdom.  
New Zealand is not richly endowed 
with mineral or energy resources. The coun-
try's natural advantage lies in the production 
of pastoral products, especially from sheep 
farming, and in the growing of softwood 
lumber. The economy traditionally has been 
based on agriculture, which currently accounts 
for about 45 percent of export revenues. 
Processing of agricultural goods and other 
manufacturing date from the 1880s, and ex-
ports from this sector have shown significant 
growth in recent years, although in 1990 they 
accounted for only one quarter of export earn-
ings. (OECD 1990: 33)  
 
The Institutional Context  
The System of Government  
The Constitution Act of 1986 patriated 
from British statutes constitutional legislation 
dating from 1852, and consolidated the essen-
tial provisions relating to the executive, legis-
lature and judiciary.  
The New Zealand system of parlia-
mentary government, although similar to In-
donesia's in important respects, is also sub-
stantially different.  
Parliament, under the Constitution Act, 
consists of the Sovereign in right of New 
Zealand and the House of Representatives.  
The House of Representatives is elected by 
universal suffrage every three years. The 
three-year term, shorter than that of Indone-
sia's House of Commons, tends to concentrate 
the initiatives undertaken by each government 
in the first year or two of its mandate.  
 Although New Zealand traditionally 
followed a "first past the post" or simple plu-
rality electoral system with single-member 
constituencies, a referendum held concurrent 
with the 1993 election resulted in a decision to 
adopt a modified form of proportional repre-
sentation. It is based on a 120-seat House, in-
creased from 99 seats. Under mixed-member 
proportional representation, electors have two 
votes: the first vote for one of 60 constituency 
seats, and the second vote to determine the 
remaining seats and the party standings in the 
House of Representatives.  
The responsibility for choosing the 
Cabinet is handled differently by the National 
and Labor parties. The National Party assigns 
the responsibility exclusively to the Prime Mi-
nister, as is done in Indonesia. However, the 
Labor Party's Cabinet selection involves both 
the parliamentary caucus and the Prime Minis-
ter; the ministers are elected by the whole cau-
cus, and then the party leader (Prime Minister) 
allocates the portfolios among those selected. 
Following the 1993 election, the Cabi-
net consisted of 20 ministers, responsible for 
35 departments varying in size and impor-
tance; most ministers hold more than one port-
folio.Among the institutions that act as a 
check on the executive are the Ombudsmen 
and the Controller and Auditor-General. New 
Zealand was the first English-speaking nation 
to adopt the ombudsman concept from Scan-
dinavia (in 1962). The statutory officers, 
namely the Chief Ombudsman and the Om-
budsman, are independent officers of Parlia-
ment appointed by the Governor General on 
the unanimous recommendation of the House 
of Representatives. Although the Ombudsmen 
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do not have executive authority, their powers 
allow for investigation of complaints and pub-
lic reporting of findings to Parliament, with 
recommendations. Investigation and disclo-
sure generally have been sufficient to bring 
about corrective action.  
New Zealand has also enacted legisla-
tion on freedom of information and on priva-
cy, comparable in some respects to equivalent 
measures in Indonesia.  
The Controller and Auditor-General, 
appointed the head of the Audit Office by sta-
tute, reports to Parliament. A committee of the 
House of Representatives, the Officers of Par-
liament Committee "...considers and recom-
mends the budgetary provision for the Audit 
Office and holds (the Controller and Auditor-
General) to account for the management of 
those resources." (Controller and Auditor-
General 1992-93:17)  
The Audit Office determines whether 
money was spent by the government in the 
manner authorized by Parliament, and it has 
powers to review the procedures of govern-
ment agencies to see that resources "have been 
applied effectively and efficiently in a manner 
that is consistent with the applicable policy of 
the Government, agency or local authority." 
(Public Finance Act (1977), section 25)  
Local government in New Zealand is 
authorized and defined by parliamentary sta-
tute. Following extensive consolidation (625 
government units were cut to 94) and other 
reforms in 1988-89, local government includes 
13 regional councils responsible for resource 
management, parks, regional planning, etc.; 74 
territorial authorities (for example, city or dis-
trict councils); and 7 special purpose boards.  
 
The Structure of the Public Service  
The following points outline the 
present structure and institutional framework 
of the New Zealand public finance (service). 
(a) The basic pattern, common to Westminster 
systems, is a politically neutral public service, 
accountable to the political executive and open 
on a competitive basis to suitably qualified 
persons who are recruited and promoted on 
the basis of merit; (b) The organization, struc-
ture and functions of the public service are 
determined by legislation, namely the State 
Sector Act (1988) and the Public Finance Act 
(1989); (c) At 31 December 1993, the public 
service was made up of three central depart-
ments and 32 other departments, divided be-
tween policy and operational functions.  
Under the State Sector Act (1988). (a) 
The Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet was reorganized in 1989, combining 
the Cabinet Office with the advisory side of 
the Prime Minister's Office and leaving sepa-
rate the Prime Minister's private office; (b) 
The Treasury advises the Minister of Finance 
and the Cabinet on fiscal policy, financial 
management, macroeconomics, and regulatory 
policies that have a major influence on eco-
nomic performance; (c) The State Services 
Commission (SSC) is headed by two statutory 
officers - Commissioner and Deputy Commis-
sioner - appointed by the Governor General in 
Council on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister for a term not exceeding five years, 
and eligible for reappointment; (d) Chief ex-
ecutives are hired on contract to head govern-
ment departments, and they sign performance 
agreements with their ministers that specify 
the targets they and their departments are ex-
pected to meet; (e) The major public service 
union is the Public Service Association. In 
1987, public sector unions joined most of their 
private sector counterparts in one national 
umbrella organization, the New Zealand 
Council of Trade Unions. 
 
New Zealand Before 1984  
From the 1960s to the 1980s, however, 
there was a notable decline in the performance 
of the New Zealand economy compared with 
those of other OECD countries. Per capita in-
come grew just 1.4 percent per annum com-
pared to 2.9 percent for the OECD as a whole 
(OECD 1993: 11). Over the same period, the 
Gross National Product per capita fell from 
fifth in the world to twentieth.  
Through regulations, subsidies and 
taxes, the government had induced poor use of 
resources, low productivity and low growth.  
	
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After the first oil shock, in 1973, eco-
nomic growth virtually stopped for more than 
a decade.  
The 1984 Economic Crisis  
Following a mid-1984 election cam-
paign dominated by economic issues. The sit-
uation was compounded by the very high level 
of government deficit and accumulated debt, 
which necessitated ongoing foreign financing. 
A major devaluation (20 percent) did 
indeed take place during the July 1984 transi-
tion of government, and in difficult political 
circumstances, because the outgoing Prime 
Minister was opposed to it. His disagreement 
led to a brief constitutional crisis, but his view 
was overturned by the urgency of the situation.  
A significant underlying cause of the 
economic crisis was a decade of worsening 
trade balances.  
 
After 1984: The Context for Public Finance 
Reform  
The changes in economic policy 
brought in by the Labor governments (1984-
90) were so extensive that they were known 
collectively as "Rogernomics", after Sir Roger 
Douglas, the Minister of Finance from 1984-
88. The essence of Rogernomics was a return 
to the free play of market forces in the econo-
my, stripping away the complex and compre-
hensive web of regulations and subsidies that 
had characterized the extensive government 
economic interventions of the past. To those 
enormous changes in economic policy was 
joined a vigorous program of social reforms. 
An understanding of the extent of those 
broader reforms helps to explain how the 
equally sweeping changes to the public service 
came about.  
Among the major economic initiatives 
of the Labor governments were: (i) removal of 
all price, wage and income controls and for-
eign exchange controls (imposed by the pre-
vious government); (ii) elimination of controls 
on foreign investment, except for certain sen-
sitive areas, such as coastal lands; (iii) remov-
al of most subsidies to agriculture and indus-
try; (iv) gradual reduction of tariffs, and acce-
leration of the trade agreement with Australia 
to implement full free trade; (v) removal of a 
wide range of regulations in non-trade sectors, 
such as transport and energy; (vi) establish-
ment of a more independent central bank 
(1989 legislation gave the central bank in-
creased autonomy to maintain price stability); 
and (vii) tax reform, including introduction of 
a goods and services tax (12.5 percent on all 
consumer goods and on services) simulta-
neously with a lower, flatter tax structure (a 
top rate of 33 percent) and a negative income 
tax for families (i.e.,using the income tax sys-
tem to deliver social assistance, with a guaran-
teed annual income). All tax expenditures 
were also eliminated.  
As for social policies, Graham Scott has 
summarized the changes since 1984 as follows: 
(i) a means test was applied to the universal 
government pension; (ii) in education, the go-
vernance of schools was transferred to parent-
elected boards, and funding was based on a per 
capita formula; (iii) in housing, the bias toward 
state-owned housing for people qualifying for 
assistance was removed by creating a uniform 
amount of assistance based on need, which 
could be spent for either private or public hous-
ing; (iv) welfare assistance for needy people 
was redesigned several times over the decade 
from 1984; (v) health care reform has been the 
most difficult area.  
Another reform, implemented through 
the 1987 Labor Relations Act, affected labor 
relations in the private sector. The key features 
of the Act were: the freedom of the parties to 
determine which issues would be subject to 
negotiation; the removal of the unions' right to 
force employers into compulsory arbitration; 
and the elimination of a complex system of 
state wage-fixing tribunals.  
Then, in 1991, the Employment Con-
tracts Act gave employers and employees in 
both the private and public sectors. (OECD 
1993: 56) The Act conferred greater bargain-
ing freedom, accorded equal status to individ-
ual and collective employment contracts and 
removed all requirements for compulsory un-
ion membership. 
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PUBLIC FINANCE REFORMS  
Strategic Result Areas for the Public Sector 
A strategic management system was 
established in 1993, when the Government 
produced a document entitled Path to 201036, 
outlining its strategic vision for New Zealand 
in the medium term. The strategic manage-
ment system also involved interactions among 
Ministers, chief executives, and central agen-
cies, which were interpreted through: (a) Stra-
tegic Results Areas (SRAs) – a limited num-
ber of major desired results for the public ser-
vice, linking higher expressions of political 
intent (Government’s desired vision) to public 
service activity; (b) Key Results Areas 
(KRAs) in the performance agreement of chief 
executives of individual departments and min-
istries; and at Department performance as-
sessments. 
In 1995, Strategic Results Areas for 
the Public Sector was published, which set out 
the strategic objectives for the 1997 period, 
and identified activities that must be done well 
over three to five years to achieve the longer-
term strategy. The Results Areas for 1994 to 
1997 were: Maintaining and accelerating eco-
nomic growth; Enterprise and innova-
tion; External linkages; Education and train-
ing; Community security; Social assistance; 
Health and disability services; Treaty claims 
settlement, and Protecting and enhancing the 
environment. 
The essence of the strategy was to be 
purposeful and selective, to focus on results 
and, to frame objectives. The government’s 
SRAs would be completed by departmental 
KRAs, which focused priorities within de-
partmental budgets and work plans and were 
part of the accountabilities set out in the per-
formance agreements. 
The new strategic management system 
was straightforward: Ministers were to decide 
and specify the government’s priorities and 
the public service was to distil them into 
achievable objectives for each department; 
Ministers and chief executives would con-
clude formal contracts to cover these priori-
ties; performance against these agreements 
would be assessed; and the information ob-
tained would be used to improve the quality of 
the next cycle. 
 
Public Finance Principles, Conventions and 
Practice 
In 1995, the State Services Commis-
sion published the Principles, Conventions 
and Practice guidance series. The series in-
cluded: (a) The Constitutional Setting, which 
described the basis and relevance of the New 
Zealand constitution within which the New 
Zealand Public Service operated, outlined 
briefly the sources of New Zealand's constitu-
tion, and discussed issues for public servants; 
(b) The Public Service and Official Informa-
tion, which was concerned with the responsi-
bility of public servants in relation to informa-
tion held by their departments and with the 
need to maintain a balance between the securi-
ty of the State and the power of the State to 
acquire, use and disclose information on the 
one hand, and the protection of individual 
rights and freedoms, and personal privacy on 
the other; (c) The Public Service and the Trea-
ty of Waitangi, which emphasized the impor-
tance of the Treaty of Waitangi, which has 
been described as New Zealand's founding 
document; (d) The Public Service and the 
Public, which stated that public servants, first 
and foremost, had a duty to the law - to uphold 
the law and the principles of justice and fair-
ness according to the law; (e) The Public Ser-
vice and the Law, which provided an overview 
of the legal framework within which public 
servants operated, and offered guidance to an 
appropriate appreciation of that framework; (f) 
The Public Service and Government, which 
discussed the nature of the official's relation-
ships with Ministers, and Cabinet; the concept 
of the collective interests of government; the 
conventions and practice related to changes of 
government; the responsibility for advocacy of 
policy; and the contestability of advice; (g) 
The Public Service and Parliament, which 
was concerned with the relationship between 
the Public Service and Parliament and also 
traversed guidance concerning Parliamentary 
questions; (h) The Senior Public Servant, 
which discussed some of the issues that arise 
	
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for senior public servants as employees; (i) 
The Public Service Employer, the purpose of 
which was to set out the statutory basis for the 
employer role of chief executives and senior 
public servants and the general legal obliga-
tions of Public Service employers; to highlight 
additional or special provisions that apply to 
Public Service employers; and to discuss some 
specific issues and particular situations that 
can arise. 
 
The Spirit of Reform 
The Spirit of Reform (Schick Review 1996) 
In 1996, another independent review of 
the New Zealand state sector management 
framework was completed. The State sector 
was more efficient, productive, and responsive, 
and there generally had been significant im-
provement in the quality of services provided 
to New Zealanders. 
The report also identified three areas 
that could be improved. Firstly, Strategic Ca-
pacity. Within strategic capacity, which was 
defined as government’s ability to make pur-
poseful and directed change, the report found 
that the SRAs and KRAs had improved gov-
ernment strategic focus. However, it also 
pointed out that the Government was still 
geared more to short-term outputs than the 
long term; 
Secondly, Resource Base. The resource 
base, or the ability to allocate resources effi-
ciently in terms of the outputs to be produced, 
was examined in light of getting both the fi-
nancial incentives right for managers and get-
ting the price right for the production of out-
puts. The report stated that the financial re-
forms had been successful and far-reaching. 
The report also identified the lack of rigorous 
costing mechanisms as hindering the process 
of negotiating and setting “price” in annual 
purchase agreements. As well, the report 
found that New Zealand still needed to deal 
with the issue of operating surplus in order to 
not distort the performance incentives within 
the system. 
Thirdly, Accountability for results. Ac-
countability, according to the report, had been 
the most successful aspect of the reforms. Al-
though specifying and reporting on outputs 
had improved over the years, the report sug-
gested that a greater use of trend and compara-
tive data in the Estimates would improve the 
ability to judge performance and lessen the 
increasing demands from Parliament for sup-
plementary questions addressed to depart-
ments. 
As Schick concluded at the end, the 
next step for the New Zealand State Sector 
was to embrace a larger agenda. They would 
have to move from management issues to pol-
icy objectives to fostering outcomes, such as 
social cohesion, that had been enunciated by 
the Government and embraced by New Zea-
landers. They would have to do for outcomes 
what had been accomplished for outputs. The 
task ahead, according to Schick, was much 
more difficult than what had been accom-
plished thus far, but the rewards of success 
would be even greater. 
 
Crown Entity Reform 
The Crown entities in New Zealand 
were normally established under their own 
empowering legislation. The statutes were of-
ten silent on what role the Ministers of State 
Services and Finance might have to implement 
who le-of-government interests. The roles of 
key players-Ministers, Crown entity Boards, 
and departments-were often unclear. 
Successive reviews also expressed 
concern about the current Crown entity gover-
nance framework. As they stated, improving 
the governance of Crown entities was impor-
tant to improve performance, and establishing 
a clearer relationship between Crown entities 
and Ministers would enhance accountability, 
which in turn would lead to improved perfor-
mance and achievement of Government's out-
comes. 
Based on these concerns, in August 
2000, the Government announced changes to 
governance and accountability arrangements 
for Crown entities and a proposed legislation. 
The Government was seeking to amend the 
current incomplete legislation to include pro-
visions that would strike the right balance be-
tween accountability and autonomy. To 
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achieve this, the Government introduced a 
Crown Entities Bill into the House of Repre-
sentatives at the end of the year. 
More than 70 Crown entities were to 
be allocated to one of four Classes: Crown 
Agents, Autonomous Crown Entities, Indepen-
dent Crown Entities, and Crown Companies. 
Each class would have its own distinct gover-
nance and accountability framework, which 
would ensure that the Government’s needs 
were met while balancing the right amount of 
flexibility for each Crown entity to function 
effectively. 
In addition to improving vertical ac-
countability management to Board to Minister 
the draft legislation also addressed concerns 
about "horizontal" connections, which would 
focus on ensuring that the work of the entity 
would be well-aligned with whole-of-
government interests, and working towards 
common outcomes. 
The proposed Crown Entities Bill was 
seen as the biggest legislative change in public 
management in the last eight years: more than 
70 Crown entities were to be given clearer go-
vernance and accountability arrangements. 
The overall Crown Entity Reform package, 
including the guidance issued, was identified 
as one of the key initiatives designed to sup-
port the Government's goal of improving trust 
in government organizations. 
 
THE REFORMS IN PERSPECTIVE  
The Progress and Results of the Reforms  
    As the record of public service 
reform - its activities, events and progress - 
emerges with greater clarity, so too does its 
impact - the difference it has made to govern-
ment performance. Although no comprehen-
sive evaluation of the reforms has been under-
taken since the Logan review, an increasingly 
broad range of information on results can be 
brought to bear.  
    The fact that the reforms passed 
successfully through examination and review 
following the 1990 change in government (in 
the form of the Logan review) is, in itself, an 
important measure of their positive effects. 
The new government continued to press for 
full implementation of the management mod-
el, and pursued additional reforms.  
    In September 1993, the Hon. Bill 
Birch, then Minister of State Services, stated 
that "there has been a revolution in the public 
service", and went on to make several positive 
observations about the strengths of the man-
agement model:  
    The scope and pace of change has 
been far-reaching and significant. Structures 
and systems have been radically reformed to-
ward the ends of greater efficiency and prod-
uctivity. Much has been achieved by restruc-
turing into business and service delivery units 
and by giving sharper focus in those ministries 
responsible for delivering policy advice. The 
results have encouraged greater flexibility and 
accountability for the use of resources - in-
cluding human resources. The focus has 
shifted from centralized controls to a concern 
for actual results. The Public Finance Act has 
extended and consolidated the management 
reforms of the State Sector Act by addressing 
the equally important issue of financial ac-
countability. It also provides a more transpa-
rent basis for the allocation and monitoring of 
public expenditure.  
From the initial stage of the passage of 
the Public Finance Act (1989), the design of 
the management model has found favor with 
the Controller and Auditor-General. As part of 
a 1989 report on the Public Accounts, the Au-
dit Office offered generally favorable com-
ments on the anticipated changes in govern-
ment management resulting from that Act. 
The accounting and financial management re-
forms are considered to have addressed 
`longstanding concerns", such as the `focus on 
the cash cost of inputs ... and poorly defined 
notions of performance", identified in the 
Controller and Auditor-General's 1978 report 
(the Shailes Report) and earlier studies. (J. 
Pallot 1992: 8) In October 1993, an overall 
assessment of the quality of financial man-
agement rated most departments as adequate 
or better, including 15 that were "satisfactory", 
meeting basic requirements, and 15 that were 
"good", with a sound, well-managed system. 
However, worthwhile improvements were 
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"possible or essential" in 25 departments, and 
the Controller and Auditor-General noted: "I 
do not regard the process of financial man-
agement reform as complete." (Controller and 
Auditor-General 1994: p. 60)  
As a result of the reforms, the public 
service is more efficient and also smaller, al-
though the very large reduction in the number 
of public servants needs to be qualified by the 
impact of transfers from the public service to 
SOEs and to Crown entities.  
One reflection of efficiency is that, in 
three years, without adjustment to their budg-
ets to reflect price increases, departments have 
shown little evidence of a decline in the vo-
lume or quality of output. There are also ob-
servable improvements in the use of assets 
generally, and in working capital and cash in 
particular. (G. Scott 1994:13) Senior officials 
we interviewed indicated that improved cash 
management alone has generated sufficient 
savings to cover many of the costs of adjust-
ment arising from the reforms.  
    There is also a view that "acknowl-
edges the efficiency gains and the clarification 
of the managerial roles which have flowed 
from the reforms while reminding people of 
the costs, e.g., administrative disruption, loss 
of institutional memory and the impact of job 
losses." (Martin, 1992: 17-18)  
In a 1994 report, entitled New Zeal-
and's Reformed State Sector, the State Servic-
es Commission offered a positive view of the 
reforms, indicating:  
The now much smaller core Public 
Service is beginning to show clear improve-
ments in operating efficiency and in respon-
siveness to clients. It costs the government 
less than it did ten years ago, and is no longer 
a regulatory impediment to ideas and produc-
tive energies in the wider economy and com-
munity.  
Three key aspects of the reforms are 
seen as "extremely successful":  
Transparency in the activities and 
processes of the State, the liberation of man-
agers from central input controls, and the new 
financial management and accounting systems 
are revolutionizing the ways in which depart-
ments and officials work.  
The Commission's report sees the pub-
lic service as "well beyond the half-way point" 
in being restructured to accommodate a re-
duced role for government departments, name-
ly "to carry out core functions which for fun-
damental constitutional or political reasons 
cannot be corporatized, or purchased from 
Crown entities, or purchased from the private 
sector." Much remains to be done to complete 
the reforms, notably "in reviewing and refin-
ing the new systems and ensuring that they are 
as responsive as possible to the needs of both 
politicians and the public."  
The Commission also assessed the 
"wider impact" of the reforms. In particular, it 
noted the negative effects of job losses: "The 
scale and significance of these impacts were 
underestimated."  
Reflecting on the reforms to date, the 
Commission expressed the concern that its 
perspective is "partly subjective and partly 
based on the results to date"; and in conse-
quence, considering that sufficient time has 
elapsed since the onset of the reforms, the 
Commission called for a full, objective as-
sessment of the results.  
The new management model is seen as 
having contributed to the government's im-
proved fiscal situation in a number of ways.  
Several indicators of this economic re-
covery are in evidence: (i) Growth in the 
economy has been stronger than expected (by 
1993 there were signs of sustained economic 
growth - the first seen in 20 years), and infla-
tion is low (less than 2 percent). This growth 
has been achieved as the world struggles to 
emerge from a period of prolonged recession. 
Although the recovery is linked to improved 
trade performance, structural reforms, includ-
ing public service reform, are also considered 
to have played a role; (ii) One of the major 
international rating agencies upgraded New 
Zealand's foreign currency credit rating in 
March 1994; (iii) Employment has been grow-
ing steadily since March 1992.  
In its 1993 Economic Survey of New 
Zealand, the OECD referred to "extensive 
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structural reforms implemented since the mid-
1980s," including "enhanced efficiency in the 
public sector," and noted: Improved macroe-
conomic performance, following the long pe-
riod of reform and adjustment, may provide a 
harbinger of stronger growth based on expand-
ing the range and market share of New Zeal-
and exports. The competitive gains that have 
occurred and seem likely to continue now 
provide New Zealand with the best opportuni-
ty it has had for many years to embark on a 
period of sustained non-inflationary growth.  
The Swiss-based Economic Forum, in 
its 1993 Report on World Competitiveness, 
moved New Zealand from a ranking of fif-
teenth among OECD countries (out of 24) to 
eighth, and ranked it first in quality of gov-
ernment. This report also rated business com-
munity optimism in New Zealand second in 
the world, which is seen as "a very significant 
turnaround after most of the last twenty years 
in the doldrums." (State Services Commission 
1994:17)  
In several respects, the public service 
reforms have sought to enhance the capacity 
of Parliament to hold the government to ac-
count for its decisions and performance. 
Greater transparency, cited above as one of the 
extremely successful elements of the reforms, 
financial statements based on the principles of 
accrual accounting, and audited statements of 
non-financial performance, are examples. An 
indication of the value of the reforms is that 
they have enjoyed bipartisan support from the 
major parties. In terms of results to date, par-
liamentary scrutiny of the performance of mi-
nisters and their officials is considered ``rela-
tively ineffectual", for a variety of reasons un-
related to public service reform, including the 
limited time that MPs devote to select com-
mittee activity and the inadequate resources 
provided to these committees. (J. Robertson, J. 
Chapman and M. Bradford, all cited in R. 
Laking 1994: 313) Nevertheless, some respon-
sive changes have been noted in the way that 
Parliament and its committees review the Es-
timates and annual reports, and compare ac-
tual with planned performance. (Scott , 1994: 
12;  Laking, 1994: 313) 
 
 
Issues relating to the reform: key elements 
After almost twenty years of reform, 
the New Zealand Public Service has made 
great improvement, taking New Zealand to the 
frontiers of performance practices internation-
ally. The main driver, an economic crisis, no 
longer exists, given the surplus recorded in 
1994 after two decades of deficit. Regarding 
the main initiatives, several key elements can 
be found through the New Zealand Public 
Service Reforms: 
 
Legislative Commitment 
New Zealand’s public sector reforms 
are well supported by legislation. The State 
Sector Act 1988, the first comprehensive legis-
lation in New Zealand’s public sector reforms, 
was designed and passed to grant managers 
greater authority and flexibility. In 1989, the 
Public Finance Act introduced a radically dif-
ferent system of financial management and 
accountability. The new system completed and 
consolidated the changes made by the State 
Sector Act, increased the relevance of perfor-
mance information, improved accountability, 
and shifted the financial management away 
from detailed control of costs to service quali-
ty and government desired outcomes. Another 
fundamental piece of legislation was the Fis-
cal Responsibility Act passed in 1994, to rede-
fine the role and responsibility of the state, 
and establish an environment facilitating re-
sponsible and business- like, longer-term pub-
lic management. These three main laws, along 
with other laws, such as the State- Owned En-
terprises Act and the Crown Entity Bill, built 
up the legislative framework, thereby ensuring 
the continuity of New Zealand’s reforms dur-
ing the transitions of the Government when 
different parties were in power. 
 
Leadership 
As noted in the Spirit of the Reforms, 
political leadership is essential to the New 
Zealand Public Sector reforms. Both the Labor 
and National Party sought to improve the eco-
nomic conditions and accountabilities. The 
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National Government pressed for full imple-
mentation of the management model and pur-
sued additional reforms. However, with the 
election of a left-wing coalition, bipartisan 
support for the reforms that had existed for 
fifteen years came to an end. After two years 
in office, the Coalition Government had made 
only modest changes. Leadership support 
comes not only from political leaders, but also 
from managers.  
In the New Zealand Public Sector, lea-
dership capacity has long been a focus. As its 
fiscal problems were resolved, New Zealand’s 
reforms entered a new stage, with a focus on 
strengthening people, culture, and leadership. 
It will be fully implemented through the State 
Sector Senior Leadership and Management 
Development Strategy in the following five 
years. 
 
Setting Objectives and Measuring Perfor-
mance 
Since the main driver of the reform 
was the country’s fiscal problems, the objec-
tives of the New Zealand public sector re-
forms were focused firstly on improving fi-
nancial management and reforming the bu-
reaucracy and process. Another objective was 
to meet the public demand of higher quality 
service while retaining fiscal responsibility. 
The reforms during 1984 and 2000 can be de-
scribed as the development of managerialism 
and a focusing on outputs. 
 One of the main priorities of the new 
government is to put more focus on results, so 
that: Firstly, citizens will find complex prob-
lems get sorted out better, find government in 
Wellington less distant, notice less duplication, 
and feel well-served by public servants; 
Secondly, ministers will see more in-
novative solutions dealing with long-standing 
problems, be more confident on policy-
making based on sound analysis and evidence, 
and hear fewer complaints about coordination 
and duplication; and  
Thirdly, staff will be better able to see 
and understand the results of their work, see 
their views being listened to and put into ac-
tion, find work more satisfying, see senior 
people in frontline, and have more contact 
with people in other sections.  
As the Minister of State Services has 
noted, since the year 2000, public manage-
ment in New Zealand has been moving to-
wards leadership and outcomes (getting re-
sults). 
 
Performance-Based Budgeting 
Performance measurement is linked to 
the budget process directly through purchase 
agreements and output budgeting. Under the 
Public Finance Act 1994, Ministers are re-
sponsible for determining the outcomes the 
government seeks. The Government then se-
lects the outputs that can best provide the out-
comes and then allocates resources to them. 
The budget process is based on performance 
information on the volume and price of the 
outputs, rather than inputs. The objective is to 
link resource allocation as closely as possible 
with performance. 
 
Performance Reporting and Reviewing 
Defining and monitoring purchase and 
ownership performance requires comprehen-
sive information about the full costs. For this 
reason, all government entities in the New 
Zealand Public Sector are required to report 
financial performance on an accrual account-
ing basis, using the same generally accepted 
accounting practices. Each department must 
provide a full set of financial statements to 
their ministers and the Treasury on a monthly 
basis. In addition, departments must also sub-
mit an audited annual Statement of Service 
Performance, outlining the outputs produced 
versus the outputs agreed. Departments also 
report publicly against their Department Fore-
cast Report. A range of approaches are used to 
review performance. The New Zealand Audit  
Office has the overall responsibility of 
reviewing the performance of the public sector 
in both financial and non-financial areas. Ad 
hoc reviews of specific programs are also un-
dertaken, both in relation to new policy objec-
tives and expenditure pressures. Another im-
portant feature of the reviewing activities in 
New Zealand’s Public Sector is the indepen-
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dent review. For instance, both the Logan Re-
view 1991 and the Spirit of the Reforms 1996 
were led by independent review groups. The 
Logan Review recommended that a standard 
of good performance for a department should 
be the existence of a program of self-review 
covering internal audit and financial controls, 
management review, and evaluation of output 
effectiveness. These reviews provide govern-
ment and Parliament with clear performance 
information for future directions. 
 
Building Performance Culture 
According to the OECD, New Zealand 
public services are more accessible and res-
ponsive, more sensitive than in the past to the 
needs of citizens and clients, and much more 
efficient, compared to its past and compared to 
many other countries. A culture of perfor-
mance is said to have penetrated New Zeal-
and’s public management. Chief executives 
and managers know and accept that they are 
judged on the performance of their organiza-
tions. Their responsibilities are set up in the 
purchase and performance agreements. They 
accept that improving performance must be an 
ongoing objective, and that it is necessary that 
productivity gains in the state sector keep pace 
with developments in the market economy. 
Public Sector employees are also getting clear 
values of performance management through 
the Public Service Code of Conduct and the 
performance-based human resource manage-
ment systems. From the year 2000 on, more 
emphasis will be put on building a perfor-
mance culture in the New Zealand Public Sec-
tor. 
  
CONCLUSION: MATTERS OF PARTIC-
ULAR RELEVANCE TO INDONESIA   
Public service management structures 
and practices in Indonesia are shaped by fac-
tors that are particular to the Indonesian expe-
rience in some respects, and common across 
Western political systems in others. To some 
extent Indonesia must find its own solutions. 
But there is much that can be learned from 
other jurisdictions - from coming to under-
stand their approaches and then adopting, or 
adapting, best practices.  
As in Indonesia, reforms in the New 
Zealand public service have been undertaken 
in response to circumstances that were specific 
to it, on the one hand, and shared with other 
Western countries, on the other. By 1984, the 
incoming government was confronted by a 
level of state intervention that was considered 
excessive, even by New Zealand standards; 
external pressures on the economy were in-
tense - a crisis was at hand; and, in some 
areas, public service management lagged be-
hind developments elsewhere. Those factors 
were considered particular to the New Zealand 
context at the time.  
However, in other respects that gov-
ernment was confronted by factors that were 
clearly not unique to New Zealand. These in-
cluded: (1) A deficit and debt situation that 
required concerted action: In addition to estab-
lishing measures to increase revenues, the 
government had to restrain, even reduce its 
spending. This obviously demanded strong 
political leadership - political will. But it also 
required the design of budgetary and related 
processes that would enhance the capacity of 
ministers to ensure that fiscal realities and 
other strategic priorities drove the framing of 
government expenditures; (2) Policies that 
were patently counter productive: Public poli-
cies across a broad front had to be reshaped. 
Ministers agreed that this required rethinking 
both longstanding commitments to particular 
policy constituencies and the efficacy of tradi-
tional approaches to the role of government. It 
also required changes so that ministers would 
be better served by way of the information and 
advice they received in formulating policies; 
(3) Management of government activities 
through highly centralized command and con-
trol systems with a plethora of constraints on 
those who deliver public services: Increased 
productivity and, to a lesser extent, greater 
responsiveness to "clients" demanded changes 
to these systems. Key ministers and senior of-
ficials recognized that a new mindset regard-
ing the critical importance of good manage-
ment in the public sector had to be established. 
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But this also required new structures and man-
agement processes to promote economy, effi-
ciency and effectiveness; (4) An approach to 
accountability that had become increasingly 
blurred and confused: Multiple and overlap-
ping authorities and responsibilities had to be 
clarified. It was acknowledged that little 
change would be forthcoming until a serious 
effort was made to distinguish more precisely 
and visibly between the respective responsibil-
ities and accountabilities of ministers and pub-
lic servants. But it also required changes bear-
ing on the relations of ministers and their offi-
cials, and improved methods of reporting to 
ministers and Parliament on the performance 
of government, its policies and operations.  
In the period since 1984, successive 
New Zealand governments, led by two differ-
ent political parties, have undertaken substan-
tial, even radical, reforms of public policies, 
structures and management systems. After a 
transition period of deteriorating economic 
conditions, these public policy and public ser-
vice reforms have had the positive effect of 
contributing to markedly improve economic 
and fiscal circumstances and prospects in New 
Zealand.  
A great deal of attention to the New 
Zealand experience since 1984, on the part of 
Indonesians and others, has focused on the 
extent to which economic and social policies, 
and the role of government, have been trans-
formed. Some aspects of this may be quite re-
levant to Indonesia; others are not. Indonesian 
governments need not emulate the New Zeal-
and approach in each and every respect in or-
der to gain from their experience. Moreover, 
some of this experience is more relevant to 
provincial governments than it is to the federal 
government, given the distribution of powers 
in our federal system.  
Despite the many differences between 
the two countries, what clearly is relevant to 
the Indonesian government are the various 
ways by which New Zealand has sought to 
address the shortcomings of public manage-
ment listed above. In each of these respects, 
the present Indonesian situation is substantial-
ly similar to the situation that confronted the 
incoming New Zealand government in 1984. 
What makes their experience especially im-
portant in these regards is that we now face 
fiscal imperatives that urgently demand fun-
damental reforms of public policies and man-
agement.  
Gaining control of our burgeoning fed-
eral debt is now a key priority of the federal 
government. Fiscal maneuverability and pro-
gram spending decisions are being seriously 
constrained by the size of the "interest bite" 
that must be paid on accumulated debt. 
The expenditure reductions required 
cannot be accomplished simply by a continua-
tion of past restraint measures. As was the 
case in New Zealand, the Indonesian govern-
ment has to reshape a wide range of policies 
and cut back programs to achieve affordable 
government. At the same time, it needs to re-
consider a number of assumptions about the 
most effective ways to manage government 
and provide quality service. Furthermore, 
there is a need to promote anew frugality in 
decision making at all levels and to install sys-
tems and incentives that foster more produc-
tive management.  
The New Zealand experience, in sev-
eral important respects, demonstrates that fun-
damental change in what governments do, and 
how well they do it, must be accompanied by 
changes to the basic features of the public 
management system itself. In seeking lessons 
from this experience, we need to look at the 
different elements in New Zealand's approach 
to reform, while recognizing that these sepa-
rate elements are components of a comprehen-
sive and integrated management model. 
 
Meeting Strategic Priorities: Strengthening 
the Budgetary Regime  
The Indonesian government's problem 
is the result of economic crisis in the 1998s. 
During this period, many changes were rec-
ommended and made to the government's in-
stitutional structures and systems for planning, 
allocating and controlling public expenditures.  
Leaving aside the question of whether 
the political will has existed to solve that pro b-
lem, the budgetary regime in place has not 
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been adequate in fostering fiscal discipline and 
expenditure restraint. In this context, it has 
become evident that reforms are urgently re-
quired to bring about the  greater public 
awareness and understanding of both the cur-
rent and long-term implications of the fiscal 
situation, and enhanced opportunities for pub-
lic and parliamentary input to budgetary deci-
sions;  a greater focus on setting relatively 
precise and unambiguous objectives to be pur-
sued by government organizations; improved 
systems and practices so that ministers and 
officials have the quality of financial and non-
financial performance information, including 
information on the costs and effectiveness of 
programs, needed for a more strategic ap-
proach to public service management; a 
strengthened capacity of Parliament to ex-
amine and assess the linkages between the 
performance of government and the allocation 
of resources to achieve desired results; and an 
enhanced public reporting of the costs and re-
sults of government services and activities as 
measured against specified objectives and 
standards.  
The New Zealand approach to these re-
lated requirements was predicated upon the 
assumption that it is necessary to distinguish 
between decisions concerning the desired out-
comes of government action and decisions 
about the outputs of government that are un-
dertaken in pursuit of these outcomes. This 
distinction was accepted as critical to the rea-
lization of the strategic priorities of ministers 
and to more productive management in gov-
ernment operations.  
As a result, the government's financial 
and budgeting systems were redesigned, as 
outlined in the foregoing sections of this 
study. The objectives were: (i) to tighten mi-
nisterial control over total public spending; (ii) 
to clarify the outcomes that ministers seek to 
obtain from public spending (and the use of 
other policy instruments); (iii) to specify with 
greater precision what ministers expect to be 
accomplished when they purchase outputs 
from departments, as reflected in various qua-
litative and quantitative performance criteria; 
(iv) to provide ministers and Parliament, on a 
regular basis, with more complete perfor-
mance information, with analysis of any va-
riance from prescribed results; and, finally, (v) 
to provide ministers, their officials and Par-
liament, with information on the costs of gov-
ernment that meets the standards of full ac-
crual accounting methods.  
It would be inaccurate to suggest that 
the New Zealand approach has not encoun-
tered some problems in implementation. Fine 
tuning of the basic processes and the addition 
of certain measures have been necessary. One 
such measure is the passage of legislation - the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act - that is intended to 
further enhance public reporting and to en-
gender parliamentary debate on fiscal matters, 
for the purpose of encouraging fiscally re-
sponsible government behavior. However, mi-
nisters and Parliament consider themselves to 
be better served by the fundamental redesign 
of their financial and budgetary systems. The 
key to this success has been the conscious ef-
fort to distinguish between outcomes and out-
puts. This is not a completely novel idea. But, 
as applied in New Zealand, it has had the posi-
tive effect of concentrating the focus of minis-
ters on what they wish to accomplish, and on 
how they must allocate scarce resources ac-
cordingly. At the same time, the adoption of 
this distinction has had major consequences 
for more productive management in the design 
and delivery of public services. 
 
Organizational Design: Separating Policy 
and Operations  
Significant structural change has been 
a characteristic of Indonesia's federal govern-
ment over the past two decades, as govern-
ments have sought to enhance ministerial con-
trol over the formulation and implementation 
of public policy and the management of gov-
ernment operations. Many of these changes 
were connected to the development of budge-
tary and financial management systems; others 
were effected in order to strengthen the coor-
dinative capacities of the central apparatus of 
government to plan and implement horizontal 
policies and to ensure a corporate approach to 
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the administrative dimensions of managing the 
public service.  
However, the policy and management 
structures of the Indonesian government be-
came too complex and too constraining. In the 
case of policy structures, there were too many 
decision points in the governmental system. 
The size of the Cabinet and the number of de-
partments and central agencies had both over-
loaded the central decision making system and 
diminished the capacities of individual minis-
ters and departments to manage their policy 
and operational responsibilities. At the same 
time, the approach to management of adminis-
trative matters had led to an excessive degree 
of central control, as the system sought to 
maintain uniform standards across government 
and to ensure "error-free" administration.  
At the same time, the capacity of the 
public service to adequately serve ministers in 
the provision of policy advice has been a con-
cern. Given our traditional approach to public 
service management, deputy ministers have 
multiple and demanding responsibilities per-
taining to a wide range of policy, administra-
tive and operational activities. The time they 
can devote to each of these is invariably li-
mited; trade-offs are necessary, and finding 
sufficient time to reflect on important strategic 
issues is often difficult. Moreover, the high 
turnover of deputy ministers means that many 
have limited experience in their departments.  
Over much of the last decade, minis-
ters have often looked for policy advice to 
their political advisors and sources outside the 
public service, rather than to their deputy mi-
nisters and departmental staff. This may have 
led to a diminution in the policy capacity of 
departments at a time when issues are increa-
singly complex and interconnected and the 
government is faced with the urgent task of 
rethinking many of its policies.  
In New Zealand, clarity of objectives 
was recognized as a key principle behind 
management reforms; this, together with ac-
ceptance of the outcomes/outputs distinction 
logically led to an extensive separation of pol-
icy and operational responsibilities. Across 
almost the full spectrum of government, mi-
nisterial departments responsible for policy 
advice, including the monitoring and evalua-
tion of policy implementation, have been se-
parated from departments and other entities 
responsible for operations, that is, the delivery 
of public services, the enforcement of regula-
tions, and so on.  
The New Zealand experience in these 
areas, while not unique in all respects, demon-
strates that it is possible, and can be beneficial, 
to seek the broadest possible separation of pol-
icy and operational responsibilities. There may 
be variations across different policy sectors in 
the extent to which the separation can (or 
should) be effected. However, it is clear that 
much more can be done to achieve this separa-
tion than has often been assumed, and that 
such a separation can both serve ministers in 
the pursuit of their policy agendas and contri-
bute to greater productivity in the management 
of operations. 
 
Delegation and Devolution of Authority  
The significant devolution of authority 
in New Zealand, however, has been effected 
within a framework that involves the clear 
specification of desired results, effective 
monitoring of performance, and the applica-
tion of incentives to achieve results in the 
most cost-effective manner. As well, devolu-
tion of management authority has been pur-
sued within a framework of corporate man-
agement policies and with due regard to best 
practices. Chief executives, for instance, are 
required in law to meet the standards of being 
a "good employer", which includes responsi-
bility for staffing on the basis of the merit 
principle and for adhering to employment eq-
uity policies; they are also responsible for en-
suring that systems for managing their re-
sources and operations are in place and meet 
high standards in respect to transparency, re-
liability and disclosure.  
  
Enhancing Ministerial and Public Finance 
Accountability  
The New Zealand reforms have en-
hanced ministerial and public finance accoun-
tability. This has been achieved primarily by 
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linking the distinction between outcomes and 
outputs, the separation of policy and opera-
tional responsibilities, and the delegation and 
devolution of authority, to mechanisms for 
securing accountability.  
The parliamentary appropriations 
process, for instance, provides increasingly 
detailed, and more intelligible, public informa-
tion on the outcomes sought by ministers and 
the outputs they wish to fund in pursuit of 
these outcomes. Ministerial accountability has 
been strengthened by virtue of the extent to 
which Parliament and the public are better in-
formed in these regards. In addition, the legis-
lative framework governing accountability for 
results has reduced the discretion of the gov-
ernment in accounting to Parliament. The 
framework requires a much greater degree of 
disclosure of financial and non-financial in-
formation respecting actual performance. It 
also specifies in some detail the kind of infor-
mation that government must provide. How-
ever, there is still considerable room for im-
provement in reporting on the extent to which 
the desired outcomes are being attained. While 
the parliamentary appropriations process re-
mains a central focal point for partisan debate 
and political evaluation, the reforms in this 
area have improved the credibility and relia-
bility of the information base upon which de-
bate and evaluation occur. This serves to en-
hance ministerial accountability, but it also 
serves ministers and the government by more 
clearly defining the actual situation facing 
them.  
Within government, the accountability 
of public servants has been strengthened by 
resorting to a more explicit contractual basis 
for relations between ministers and their chief 
executives. Greater clarity in responsibilities, 
and thus accountabilities, has been the result. 
Further, the greater transparency of these rela-
tionships has further enhanced chief executive 
accountability to ministers. Equally important, 
the practical utility of this approach has been 
underscored by the significant delegation of 
authorities to chief executives made possible 
by enhanced accountability. Chief executives 
can be given the authority necessary to deliver 
the results expected of them because these re-
sults are clearly specified in advance. Given 
this structure of relations, chief executives 
have clear incentives to manage their depart-
ments in ways that serve ministers and the 
public - the delivery of their specified outputs 
(except in the case of confidential policy ad-
vice) is subject to regular and rigorous public 
reporting and audit requirements. In turn, this 
accountability regime gives chief executives 
every incentive to develop well-performing 
organizations, encompassing devolved author-
ity and accountability, precisely because the 
performance of the chief executive is intimate-
ly tied to the performance of her or his subor-
dinates and the effectiveness of departmental 
management systems and operational proce-
dures. 
 
Making Change Happen  
A number of public finance manage-
ment reforms over the last several decades 
have served to improve governance in Indone-
sia. In too many cases, however, reform meas-
ures have failed to realize their full potential. 
Certainly the need for fundamental change 
was widely accepted. Furthermore, in some 
departments and agencies, or parts thereof, 
progress had been made, although sometimes 
as a result of initiatives only loosely, if at all. 
However, overall, the desired results had not 
been obtained, largely because the necessary 
commitment from key players did not exist or 
because the reforms were not adequately inte-
grated with fiscal realities and with broader 
government objectives. Given these problems, 
it is not surprising that mixed messages had 
been communicated, expectations had been 
badly managed, and the behavior of ministers 
and senior officials too often had contradicted 
reform rhetoric. Coherence and consistency 
are usually the first victims of disjointed ap-
proaches to reform.  
Until 1984, experience in New Zealand 
seems to have echoed our own. Problems in 
public finance management had long been 
known to exist. But other factors were equally 
important, notably the coherence of the reform 
program and the leadership of key central 
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agency officials who oversaw its development 
and articulation, and who drove its implemen-
tation. As well, the use of legislative levels, 
and the incorporation into the management 
model of incentives to enhance productive 
performance, were instrumental in overcom-
ing the inertia that had plagued earlier reform 
initiatives.  
As the New Zealand case demon-
strates, it is also necessary for ministers and 
officials to agree on a reform strategy that 
links improved governance to improved man-
agement. This requires that reforms not only 
serve, and be seen to serve, the broad policy 
agenda of ministers, but that they address 
management shortcomings progressively, on 
the basis of a well thought-out, coherent and 
practical course of action.  
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